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Abstract 
Internal state predicates or ISPs refer to 
internal states of sentient beings, such as 
emotions, sensations and thought 
processes. Japanese ISPs with zero 
pronouns exhibit the “person restriction” in 
that the zero form of their subjects must be 
first person at the utterance time. This 
paper examines the person restriction of 
ISPs in Japanese in contrast with those in 
Thai, which is a zero pronominal language 
like Japanese. It is found that the person 
restriction is applicable to Japanese ISPs 
but not to Thai ones. This paper argues that 
the person restriction is not adequate to 
account for Japanese and Thai ISPs. We 
propose a new constraint to account for this 
phenomenon, i.e., the Experiencer-
Conceptualizer Identity (ECI) Constraint, 
which states that “The experiencer of the 
situation/event must be identical with the 
conceptualizer of that situation/event.” It is 
argued that both languages conventionalize 
the ECI constraint in ISP expressions but 
differ in how the ECI constraint is 
conventionalized. 
1 Introduction 
Japanese is typologically known as a zero 
pronominal language, in which pronominal 
elements can take the zero form, unlike those in 
English. Japanese shares this characteristic with 
Thai even though the two languages differ 
drastically in morphological structure and in 
constituent order. Japanese is an agglutinating and 
head-final whereas Thai is isolating and head-
initial.  
Zero pronouns, or unexpressed referents, in 
zero pronominal languages differ from the so-
called pro-drop phenomena present in languages 
such as Italian and Spanish, where subject 
arguments can be omitted, and the verbal 
inflections will continue to reflect the person, 
number and gender of the dropped arguments. 
Covert referents in East and Southeast Asian 
languages can occupy various grammatical roles 
and can be identified through discourse-pragmatic 
inference rather than through verbal morphology. 
Interestingly, however, internal state predicates in 
Japanese are known to have the so-called “person 
restriction”, which serves to identify the person of 
the experiencer-subject in a way similar to the pro-
drop phenomena, as we see in the following 
discussion. This paper closely examines the 
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internal state predicates (ISPs, henceforth) of 
Japanese from a contrastive perspective with those 
of Thai, another zero pronominal language, and 
makes a typological characterization of ISPs in 
Japanese and the “person restriction” phenomena 
exhibited by them.  
2 Internal state predicates and the person 
restriction 
ISPs are those predicates denoting internal states 
such as emotions, sensations, thought processes, 
etc. of sentient beings (Iwasaki 1993). It is well 
known that ISPs in Japanese exhibit the so-called 
“person restriction” when they refer to an 
experiencer’s internal state at the time of the 
utterance (Kuroda 1973, Kuno 1973, Ohye 1975, 
Iwasaki 1993, inter alia). Kuroda was among the 
first researchers to discuss this restriction: he 
examined ISPs of Japanese, such as atui ‘hot’, 
kanasii ‘sad’ and sabisii ‘lonely’ and noted that the 
subjects of such adjectives “must be first person”
(Kuroda 1973: 378). His examples are reproduced 
below in (1) – (3) 
(1)  Watasi-wa atui ‘I am hot.’ 
(2)  *Anata-wa atui ‘You are hot.’ 
(3) *John-wa atui ‘John is hot.’     
Some clarifications of possible complications 
in the grammatical behavior of ISPs in Japanese 
are in order. Firstly, as Kuroda himself notes, those 
Japanese sentences with ISPs in (1) – (3), as well 
as their English translations, are ambiguous 
between the experiencer subject interpretation (i.e., 
‘I feel hot.’) and the stimulus subject interpretation 
that the subject nominal is ascribed to have a 
certain property which stimulates one to have a 
certain feeling (i.e., ‘I am a hot person.’). 
Furthermore, ordinary uses of sensation adjectives 
like atui ‘hot’ without their overt subjects includes 
ones in which their referents are indeterminate, 
rather than ambiguous (Nakamura, forthcoming). 
(See also Shibatani’s (1990: 361) treatment of atui 
and samui as “zero-argument” predicates which 
express ambient conditions.)  
Secondly, the person restriction in question 
holds in ordinary communicative situations, but it 
is often lifted in what Kuroda (1973) calls “non-
reportive” style situations, such as literary work in 
which a story is told by a narrator who is 
omniscient. This makes sense: because the narrator 
is omniscient, she can be the “first person” in 
describing the internal state of any character in the 
story. (See Kuroda 1973 for more details, and see 
also Iwasaki’s (1993) “literary mode” and 
“colloquial mode” for a similar distinction. 
Thirdly, although the use of ISPs with the 
second person subject is rendered unacceptable by 
Kuroda in (2), we should point out that its 
unacceptability arises, at least in part, from the 
pragmatic infelicity of the speaker making an 
assertion as to the internal state of the hearer, 
which is readily accessible for the hearer herself, 
but not for the speaker. This is in fact evidenced by 
the fact that their use with the second person 
subject is rendered acceptable in interrogatives: 
Anata wa atui? ‘Are you hot?’, but not in 
declaratives as in (2). Another more relevant piece 
of evidence for the pragmatic factor which 
explains the ill-formedness of ISPs in (2) comes 
from the fact that the same acceptability pattern 
with the second person subjects holds for ISPs in 
Thai as well as shown in (4). However, we will 
demonstrate in the next section that Thai ISPs do 
not exhibit the “person restriction” pointed out for 
Japanese ISPs. 
(4) a. *khun     rɔ́ɔn  
            you      hot  
            ‘You are hot.’   
      b.   khun   rɔ́ɔn   ma&i? 1 
            you   hot     QP 
            ‘Are you hot?’ 
In other words, the pattern observed for the second 
person in (2) is not a property of the “person 
restriction” per se. Therefore, in order to focus on 
the person restriction in our discussions below, we 
will mainly examine the contrast in grammatical 
behaviors between first person and third person 
experiencer patterns. We shall get back to this 
point later in Section 3. 
Lastly, let us repeat a caveat from Uehara 
(2006): the person restriction of ISPs is different 
from, and is not to be confused with, the non-
canonical case-marking patterns cross-
                                                 
1  The following abbreviations are used for glosses in this 
paper: NOM = nominative particle, PFV = perfective aspect, 
POL = politeness marker, PRG = progressive aspect, QP = 
question particle, RES = resultative aspect, sg = singular, TOP 
= topic particle. 
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linguistically attested for ISPs as well as other 
predicates denoting non-canonical types of events 
(e.g., Croft 1991). The latter case is illustrated with 
Spanish examples in (5), where the experiencer 
role noun takes the object case, but does not 
exhibit the person restriction of our concern. 
(5) a.  Me     gusta          Maria. 
          ‘I       (OBJ.) like   Maria.’ 
       b.  Le     gusta          Maria. 
          ‘He/She (OBJ.) likes Maria.’ 
Similarly, according to Iwasaki (2002), ISPs (his 
“proprioceptive-state” predicates) in Thai employ 
the “non-canonical” [VN] order (e.g. Pùat hu&a. 
(lit. ‘aches head’) ‘I/He/She have/has a 
headache.’), when “[s]ince Thai is a rather typical 
SVO language, the [NV] order is expected for 
intransitive stative verbs” (p.34). Notice that these 
expressions can be used for the third person 
experiencer as well. In Japanese, as well, ISPs 
constitute the “double nominative” construction, in 
which both experiencer- and stimulus-role nouns 
take nominative case-marking when both are overt: 
watasi-ga mizu-ga hosii (I-NOM water-NOM 
want) ‘I want water.’ Interesting though these 
phenomena are, they do not directly concern us 
here in our discussions on the person restriction. 
3 Person restriction of ISPs in Japanese 
and Thai in contrast  
This section examines the structure and range of 
the “person restriction” of ISPs in Japanese and 
compares them with corresponding ISPs in Thai. 
Let us discuss emotion predicates, such as uresii
‘glad’, kanasii ‘sad’ and sabisii ‘lonely’ in 
Japanese first. Such emotional lexical items belong 
to the lexical category of “adjectives” of the 
language, which, unlike adjectives in English, do 
not take the copula to constitute a predicate. An 
emotion adjective, uresii ‘glad’, in (6) below 
illustrates the structure and person restriction of 
ISPs in Japanese [parentheses indicate those 
constituents that can be implicit.2] 
                                                 
2 The Japanese language possesses another group of adjectival 
words, which are called “adjectival nouns” (Martin 1975) or 
“nominal adjectives” (Kuno 1973). They developed later in 
the history of the language than (regular, i-ending) adjectives. 
Emotion words in that category, unlike emotion adjectives, do 
not typically exhibit the person restriction (e.g. suki ‘like/fond 
 
(6) (watasi-wa / *kare-wa)  uresii. 
      I-TOP  /    he-TOP glad 
‘I am/ he is glad.’ 
(7)  a. (kare-wa) uresi-soo-da. / uresi-gat-teiru. 
            he-TOP    glad-seem     / glad-show.the.                                
signs.of-PRG 
          ‘He seems glad/is showing the signs of being  
glad.’  
        b. (kare-wa)   uresii  yoo-da.  
            he-TOP      glad   it.appears.that  
           ‘It appears that he is glad.’ 
        c. (kare-wa)   uresii  no-da.3 
            he-TOP      glad   it.is.that  
           ‘(It is that) He is glad.’ 
As noted earlier and illustrated again in (6), ISPs in 
Japanese in their default/unmarked forms can take 
the first person, but not the third person, for their 
subject. To indicate the third person experiencer’s 
internal states, their predicate forms must be 
marked with some morphemes of evidentiality. 
Four such morphemes are exemplified in a.-c. in 
(7) and they differ from one another in several 
ways. Structurally, for instance, soo-da ‘seem’ and 
gat-teiru ‘showing the signs of’ in (7a) are attached 
to the stem forms of the emotion adjectives and 
thus replace the –i inflectional ending of these 
adjectives. In contrast, yoo-da ‘it appears that’ in 
(7b) and no-da ‘it is that’ in (7c) are attached to the 
finite forms of emotion adjectives. Thus, they can 
be attached to the –katta past tense forms of 
emotion adjectives as well: (kare-wa) uresi-katta 
yoo-da/no-da. ‘It appears that/It is that he was 
glad.’  
Among such morphemes in (7), however, one 
important distinction in terms of the person 
restriction in question is the one between soo-da, 
gat-teiru, and yoo-da in (7a) and (7b), on the one 
hand, and no-da in (7c), on the other. As Kuroda 
1973 and Ohye 1975 note, the attachment of the 
                                                                             
of’ as in watasi-wa/kare-wa Hanako-ga suki da ‘I like/He 
likes Hanako.’). However, some (e.g. Ohye 1975: 200) report 
some (e.g. huan ‘worried’) exhibit the same pattern as emotion 
adjectives, as in watasi-wa/??kare-wa huan da. ‘I am/??He is 
worried.’. 
3 In colloquial speech, the no of no-da ‘it is that’ (and of its 
polite variant no-desu) is almost always reduced to the so-
called “mora nasal” n to render n-da (and n-desu). Thus, in 
conversational discourse, the natural and more frequently 
attested sentence form of (c) in (7) is: (kare wa) uresii n-da. 
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former set of evidentiality morphemes to ISPs 
makes the third person subject possible, but in turn 
makes the first person subject unacceptable as 
in ???watasi-wa uresi-soo-da. ‘I seem glad.’ In 
contrast, the latter, no-da ‘it is that’, simply lifts 
the person restriction, thus making the third person 
subject, in addition to the first person subject, 
possible as shown in (8) (cf. (6) above). 
(8) (watasi-wa  / kare-wa) uresii  no-da.  
              I-TOP   / he-TOP  glad   it.is.that  
      ‘(It is that) I am/He is glad.’ 
It is beyond the scope of the current study to 
fully characterize semantic effects of no-da in 
Japanese, which is glossed here as ‘it is that’ for 
the lack of a better translation. Regarding its use 
with ISPs with the third person subject, however, 
Kuroda’s description is worth noting here. Using 
the sentence Mary-wa sabisii no-da, where no-da 
is attached to an emotion adjective sabisii ‘lonely’ 
with the third person subject Mary, Kuroda (1973: 
381) gives a simple sentence ‘Mary is lonely’ for 
its English translation and describes the semantic 
effects of no-da as follows:  
“The speaker asserts that he knows that 
Mary is lonely but his knowledge is not 
solely or perhaps even not at all based on 
what he perceives of Mary. The sentence 
does not tell how he knows what he knows, 
and it can sound just like an a priori 
declaration–“Mary must be lonely.” He 
might perhaps be able to judge from past 
experience that Mary is lonely, using 
circumstantial evidence of a kind that would 
not allow a neutral party to draw such a 
conclusion. Or he might even have been told 
by Mary that she was lonely.” (Kuroda 
1973:381)  [underlining added by the 
authors] 
The grammatical behavior as represented in 
(8) and the semantic effects in the above quote of 
emotion adjectives in the no-da construction in 
Japanese are interesting from the contrastive 
perspective between ISPs in Japanese and those in 
Thai. In terms of grammatical behaviors and 
functions, Japanese ISPs in the no-da construction, 
rather than those by themselves, resemble Thai 
ISPs.  
Emotion predicates in Thai, such as dii-cai 
‘glad’, sǐa-cai ‘sad’ and rɔɔn-cai ‘worried’ (See 
more examples in Iwasaki 20024), do share the 
structure with emotion adjectives in Japanese in 
that they do not take the copula in predication, 
unlike their counterpart adjectives in English. The 
use of emotion predicates in Thai is illustrated with 
dii-cai ‘glad’ in (9).  
 
(9)  (chǎn / khǎw)  dii-cai5 
        I / he  glad  
      ‘I am/He is glad.’ 
As noted earlier, Thai and Japanese share the zero 
anaphoric nature (indicated with parentheses 
above), again departing from English. Since 
emotion predicates of the two languages 
structurally resemble each other on these two 
accounts, comparison of the patterns of emotion 
predicates in (9) and (6) brings to the fore a 
characteristically structural contrast between Thai 
and Japanese, i.e., the person restriction. Both first 
and third person subjects are possible for Thai 
emotion predicates. In contrast, Japanese emotion 
predicates allow only the overt and covert forms of 
the first person subject. Emotion predicates in Thai 
in (9) rather pattern with those in the no-da 
construction in (8) on all the three accounts. We 
will get back to these points later. 
  The remainder of this section examines ISPs 
other than emotion predicates in the two languages, 
namely, predicates of desire, sensation and thought 
processes. We will focus on the range as well as 
                                                 
4 Notice here that Thai emotion predicates share a common 
form of [V-cay]. This study basically follows Iwasaki’s 
treatment of “the [V-cay] expressions as [V-Suffix]” in 
Iwasaki (2002:49-51). See his discussion of the evidence for 
it. He notes that it is “a unit consisting of a verb and a suffix, 
the latter of which has been grammaticalized from the lexical 
noun meaning ‘heart’” (p. 60). 
5  In neutral contexts, the first person is the preferred 
interpretation for the covert subject of ISPs in Thai, and the 
third person is a possible interpretation only in marked 
contexts such as below: 
 A:   thammay  khǎw hǔarɔ́ʔ daŋ yàaŋ nán  
        Why         he      laugh   loudly   kind      that 
‘Why did he laugh so loudly?’ 
 B: dii-cay 
 glad 
‘(He) is glad’      
However, even in such marked contexts, ISPs in Japanese 
cannot be used for the third person subject and require 
morphemes such as no-da, as in (8). 
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the types of the “person restriction” phenomena 
exhibited by ISPs in Japanese and find out whether 
the structural contrast between the two languages 
in terms of the person restriction prevails 
throughout the whole range.  
 Predicates of desire, which are adjectives hosii 
‘want’ and –tai ‘want to’, like emotion predicates 
in Japanese, also exhibit the same person 
restriction as in (10). This is contrasted with Thai 
predicates of desire, which allows both the first 
and the third person subjects as in (11). 
Japanese 
(10)  (watasi-wa / *kare-wa)      biiru-ga   
 I-TOP        /    he-TOP      beer-NOM 
hosii. /nomi-tai.        
       want  /drink-want.to 
       ‘I want/want to drink beer.’ 
 
Thai 
(11) (chǎn / khǎw)  yàak  dɯ̀ɯm  b̞ia 
         I      / he  want  drink      beer 
  ‘I/he want(s) to drink beer.’ 
Iwasaki (2002) reports that Thai has a wide 
range of pain terms, e.g. cèp ‘pain, a general cover-
term’, pùat ‘deep-seated aching, usually felt to be 
hot and diffuse’, and sìat ‘focused abdominal pain’ 
(these examples and glosses are originally from 
Diller’s 1980 list of 15 Thai pain terms), while 
Japanese has only one general adjective itai used 
with an array of onomatopoetic expressions, e.g. 
sikusiku itai for griping pain, zukizuki itai for 
throbbing pain, and hirihiri itai for tingling pain 
(examples and descriptions are from Iwasaki 2002: 
61, footnote 4). The relevant and important point 
for the current study is that this general adjective 
itai in Japanese has the person restriction, so that 
all the pain expressions with itai exhibit the person 
restriction, as exemplified in (12), while their Thai 
counterpart expressions do not have the restriction, 
as in (13). 
 
Japanese 
(12)  (watasi-wa / *kare-wa) atama-ga   itai. 
         I-TOP       /  he-TOP  head-NOM  ache 
        ‘I have a headache.’ 
Thai 
(13)  (chǎn  /  khǎw)     pùat         hu&a 
   I       /   he          painful     head 
         ‘I have/ He has a headache.’ 
Japanese ISPs with the person restriction 
include the expressions of thought processes as 
well, such as omou ‘think’, nozomu ‘hope’, and 
negau ‘wish’ (see Ohye 1975). Unlike emotion 
adjectives, these words are verbs and denote a 
change of state (e.g., ‘come to think’, rather than a 
state ‘think’, in the case of omou). Therefore, the 
internal state of a person at the speech time, first 
person or third person, can be expressed as the 
resulting state of that thought process using the 
resultative aspect marker te-iru. For the first person 
subject only, however, default forms of such verbs 
can be used to the same effect as the person 
restriction exhibited by emotion adjectives (Uehara 
2011). The examples with omou ‘think’ below in 
(14) illustrate the situation in Japanese. In contrast, 
the Thai word khít ‘think’ exhibits no such 
constraint, as in (15): 
 
Japanese 
(14) a. (watasi-wa / *kare-wa)   yotoo-ga 
    I-TOP       /    he-TOP    ruling.party-NOM 
    makeru      to      omou. 
    lose           that    think 
           ‘I think that the ruling party will lose (in the 
next election.’ 
       b. (watasi-wa /kare-wa)    yotoo-ga 
           I-TOP       /  he-TOP     ruling.party-NOM 
           makeru      to      omot-teiru. 
           lose           that    think-RES 
           ‘I/He think(s) that the ruling party will lose 
(in the next election).’ 
Thai 
(15)  (chǎn / khǎw)    khít      wâa      phák 
    I       / he          think    that      party  
 rátthabaan       càʔ       phɛ́ɛ 
        government     will       lose 
        ‘I/he think(s) that the government party will 
lose (in the next election).’ 
It should be noted furthermore that Japanese 
has some other verbal expressions of internal states 
that exhibit the person restriction in a way similar 
to, but still different from, the verbs of the thought 
processes above. These include verbs such as 
tukareru ‘get tired’, odoroku ‘be surprised’, 
komaru ‘feel troubled’ and verbal idioms such as 
onaka-ga suku (stomach-NOM get.empty) ‘get 
hungry’ and nodo-ga kawaku (throat-NOM 
get.dry) ‘get thirsty’ (Ohye 1975). These verbal 
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expressions also denote the internal states of 
human beings, to which only the experiencer in 
principle has direct access. The perfect/past –ta 
forms of these verbs can indicate the internal states 
of the speaker only, while their resultative aspect –
te-iru forms, just like verbs of thought processes 
discussed just above, can take third- as well as 
first-person subjects. The sentences with tukareru 
‘get tired’ in (16) illustrate the situation in 
Japanese. In contrast, its translation equivalent in 
Thai, mòt phalaŋ (exhaust strength) ‘feel 
physically exhausted’ (as well as mòt kamlaŋcay 
(exhaust mental-energy) ‘feel mentally 
exhausted/discouraged’) exhibits no such 
constraint, as in (17) [slightly modified from 
Iwasaki 2002:43]. 
Japanese 
(16) a. (watasi-wa  /  ??kare-wa)  tukare-ta. 
                 I-TOP    /      he-TOP    get.tired.PFV 
           ‘I have got tired.’ 
        b. (watasi-wa / kare-wa)   tukare-te-iru. 
                  I-TOP   / he-TOP     get-tired-RES 
           ‘I/He feel(s) tired.’ 
Thai 
(17)   (chǎn / khǎw)   mòt  phalaŋ 
     I      / he        exhaust    physical.strength 
         ‘I/he feel(s) physically exhausted.’ 
In summary, all the data above indicate the 
following: 1) both languages, as zero pronominal 
languages, allow the experiencer subjects of ISPs 
to be implicit and lack person-indicating copula 
verbs, which are required in English and pro-drop 
languages such as Spanish; 2) only ISPs in 
Japanese exhibit the person restriction and such a 
restriction is not observed for corresponding ISPs 
in Thai; 3) All ISPs in Japanese have some parallel, 
but structurally more-marked, patterns that behave 
and function exactly like their corresponding Thai 
ISPs. 
4. Proposed characterization of the so-
called “person restriction” 
Thus far the term “(first) person restriction” has 
been used in this study to refer to the phenomena 
exhibited by ISPs in Japanese. This term comes 
from Kuroda’s characterization of the phenomena 
as one in which the subject of ISPs “must be first 
person” (Kuroda 1973: 378) and from the 
observations of their use in assertions as in (1) - 
(3). However, such characterizations of the 
phenomena prove to be incorrect considering the 
fact that, in interrogative sentences, their subjects 
can be second person, as noted earlier. In fact, 
Kuroda (ibid.) himself notes in a footnote to his 
characterization above that “This restriction, 
however, applies to declarative sentences. In 
interrogative sentences it is reversed” and gives a 
pair of examples, which are reproduced in (18) 
below for comparison with (1) and (2). 
(18) a. ???watasi-wa     atui     desu    ka 
                            I-TOP       hot     POL    QP 
‘Am I hot?’ 
             b.   anata-wa       atui    desu     ka 
                   You-TOP      hot     POL    QP 
‘Are you hot?’ 
 
Faced with this set of data, and taking some others 
to be discussed later into consideration, this study 
proposes to modify this popular characterization of 
the constraint known as the “(first) person 
restriction” and to term it instead as the 
“Experiencer-Conceptualizer Identity Constraint”, 
which is stated below.  
The Experiencer-Conceptualizer Identity (ECI) 
Constraint:  
The experiencer of the situation/event 
must be identical with the conceptualizer of 
that situation/event.  
The term “conceptualizer” is taken from the 
cognitive linguistic literature (e.g. Langacker 
1985 6 ) and is defined here as the person who 
conceives of a situation/event for and before 
making an assertion/statement about it. Thus, the 
conceptualizer is different from the speaker in that 
the latter is person-based while the former is not. 
The speaker can be equated with the 
conceptualizer only by default, i.e., in declarative 
sentences. Accordingly, in the interrogative 
sentences in (18) above, the conceptualizer is the 
addressee, not the speaker, because it is the 
addressee who takes the role of conceiving and 
making an assertion/judgement about the situation 
                                                 
6 More recently, Langacker (2008: Sec. 13.2.3) describes in 
detail the conceptualizer role in a question scenario as well as 
in other basic speech act scenarios. 
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described. Thus, the sentence in (18a) is  
infelicitous because it violates the ECI constraint: 
the experiencer is the speaker while the 
conceptualizer is the hearer (E≠C). In contrast, the 
sentence in (18b) does not violate the constraint 
and is considered felicitous: the experiencer is the 
addressee and so is the conceptualizer (E=C).
 This new characterization of the constraint that 
ISPs in Japanese exhibit has some merits over the 
previous, person-based one. Firstly, it clearly 
indicates that neither the phenomena nor the 
formal distinction is person-based, and that the 
bare/marked formal distinction of ISPs in Japanese 
differs in essence from the person-marking 
distinction of inflectional forms in the so-called 
pro-drop languages, such as Spanish. In Spanish, 
internal states are expressed with adjectives (e.g. 
feliz ‘happy’) + the copula verb estar, which 
inflects for person and number: estoy for the first 
person singular and estás for the second person 
singular. Obviously, the morphological person 
distinction persists whether the sentence is 
assertive or interrogative, as in (19). 
 
(19) a.  (Yo)      estoy   feliz. 
             (I)        be.1sg  happy 
             ‘(I) am happy.’ 
        b.  ¿Estás  (tú)  feliz? 
             be.2sg   (you)    happy        
             ‘Are (you) happy?’ 
 Secondly, this definition of the constraint can 
obviate other, rather ad-hoc, parenthetical 
statements/explanations to the previous person-
based definition. For example, as noted and quoted 
above in (18), Kuroda gives an explanation for the 
person restriction that it is “reversed” in 
interrogative sentences. However, for the third 
person subject, it is not reversed and still applies 
even in interrogative sentences in Japanese, as 
shown in (20) [cf. (18) and (3)]. 
(20)  *kare-wa  atui desu ka 
     He-TOP  hot  POL QP 
  ‘Is he hot?’ 
The new characterization of the constraint 
correctly renders the use of ISPs in the 
interrogative sentence in (20) ungrammatical, 
where the third person experiencer is not identical 
with the second person conceptualizer, without 
recourse to any additional qualification on the 
constraint. 
Thirdly, the new characterization of the 
grammatical phenomena of ISPs in Japanese 
correctly captures their behavior in the embedded 
clauses as well. As noted in the previous section, 
the attachment of evidentiality morphemes such as 
soo-da ‘seem’ to ISPs makes the third person 
subject possible, but in turn makes the first person 
subject unacceptable as in (21) below. 
(21) a. (watasi-wa / *kare-wa)  uresii.   (=(6)) 
     I-TOP  /   he-TOP glad 
‘I am/ he is glad.’ 
        b. (kare-wa /???watasi-wa) uresi-soo-da. 
               he-TOP  /       I-TOP glad-seem   
           ‘He seems /I seem glad.’ 
 However, when the sentence (21b) above is 
embedded in a sentence with the third person 
subject, it becomes apparent that what soo-da 
precludes is not the first person, but the 
conceptualizer, which corresponds to the 
upper/main clause subject as shown in (22) below 
(modified from Ohye 1975:202). 
 
(22)     Taroi-wa      (??zibuni-/karej-/watasi-ga) 
            Taro-TOP         self-   / he-   /   I-NOM 
          uresi-soo-da   to     Hanako-ni     itta. 
          glad-seem      that   Hanako-to   said 
          ‘Taroi told Hanako that hei/hej/I seemed 
glad.’ 
In the same vein, when the sentence (21a) is 
embedded as a reported speech in a sentence with 
the third person subject, the grammaticality is 
reversed: the subject of ISPs cannot be the speaker, 
but the third person, who is the upper clause 
subject, as in (23) below. 
 
(23)     Taroi-wa      (zibuni-/*karej-/*watasi-ga) 
            Taro-TOP     self-   / he-      /   I-NOM 
          uresii   to     Hanako-ni     itta. 
          glad     that   Hanako-to  said 
          ‘Taroi told Hanako that hei/hej/I was glad.’ 
What is at issue here is not the (first) person, but 
the conceptualizer, who conceives and describes 
the internal states of some sentient being. 
 Finally, the ECI constraint gives natural 
accounts of why the phenomena in question cannot 
be found in the non-reportive style, but in the 
reportive style only, and even of exceptions to this 
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stylistic rule as well. As noted earlier (where the 
default-case term “first-person” was used instead 
of “conceptualizer”), in omniscient narrator stories, 
one of the non-reportive contexts, ISPs can be used 
freely with third person subjects. This is because, 
under our new characterization of the constraint, 
the omniscient narrator as the conceptualizer 
knows the experiences of any character in the story 
to the effect that she can be identical with the 
experiencer of these internal states. In other words, 
it is not that the restriction is “lifted” under some 
condition, but rather that the ECI constraint takes 
effect in the case of an omniscient narrator in the 
literary mode. Furthermore, it should be noted that 
the ECI constraint takes effect (i.e., bare ISP forms 
can be used only when the experiencer of the 
internal state is identical with the conceptualizer 
and otherwise ISPs have to be marked with no-da 
or the like) in Japanese even in soliloquy and in 
writing personal diaries––contexts not in the least 
“reportive”. 
5. The ECI constraint in Japanese and 
Thai  
We have seen that the ECI constraint is 
conventionalized lexically in a lot of ISPs in 
Japanese, whereas Thai ISPs have no such 
constraint. 7 Japanese also possesses a grammatical 
construction, namely, the no-da construction, 
which, when used with ISPs, serves to lift the ECI 
constraint and make them behave like their 
counterpart ISPs in Thai. In other words, this no-da 
morpheme has the ECI constraint-lifting function. 
It should be added here that Thai also 
possesses a constructional expression, namely, the 
caŋ construction, which combines ISPs with the 
morpheme caŋ ‘truly’ and does just the opposite of 
the no-da construction in Japanese. This morpheme 
functions to IMPOSE the ECI constraint on ISPs 
which it is attached to in Thai, and make them 
behave exactly like bare ISPs in Japanese, as in 
(24).  
 
 
                                                 
7 This can be characterized as a cross-linguistic difference in 
lexicalization patterns (Talmy 1985), and in typological 
studies of ISPs Japanese and Thai represent two sub-types of 
the zero pronominal language type. 
(24) a.   (chǎn/khǎw)     dii-cai   (= (9) ) 
   I      / he  glad 
‘I am/He is glad.’ 
        b.   (chǎn /*khǎw)  dii-cai    caŋ  
I       /   he   glad       really              
‘I am so glad.’ 
The above fact gives us the overall picture of the 
ECI constraint phenomena in Japanese and Thai as 
summarized in Table 1 below with ISPs, uresii
‘glad’ in Japanese and dii-cai ‘glad’ in Thai: 
    
 Japanese Thai 
The ECI constraint  uresii dii-cai  caŋ 
No constraint uresii  no-da dii-cai 
 
Table 1: The ECI in Japanese and Thai 
 
Table 1 clearly shows the contrast between 
Japanese and Thai regarding the ECI constraint 
phenomena involving ISPs. Both languages have 
conventionalized the ECI constraint in their 
expressions of internal states of sentient beings. 
The difference lies in which level of linguistic 
structure it is conventionalized. In Japanese the 
ECI constraint is conventionalized at the lexical 
level, whereas in Thai it is conventionalized at the 
grammatical level. That is, the two languages 
differ in how the ECI constraint is linguistically 
conventionalized. 
6. Conclusion 
ISPs in Japanese and the so-called “person 
restriction” they exhibit have been formerly 
examined in comparison to ISPs in languages like 
English, which have explicit person systems 
developed and/or disallow omission of personal 
pronouns. This paper has contrasted ISPs in 
Japanese with those in Thai, which belongs 
together with Japanese to the zero pronominal 
language type (with no person marking). It has 
thus brought to the fore typological characteristics 
of ISPs in Japanese, as well as the range and 
structural variations of the phenomena exhibited by 
them. 
We have shown that the so-called “person 
restriction” is not person-based, but is based rather 
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on the identity of the experiencer of internal states 
with the conceptualizer of the events, so that it 
should rather be termed as the Experiencer-
Conceptualizer Identity Constraint. Since it is not 
person-based, the ECI constraint reasonably 
accounts for the use of ISPs in Japanese in wider 
contexts than the traditional “reportive” context, 
such as one where no interlocutor is present. We 
have argued that the difference between ISPs in 
Japanese and those in Thai lies in the patterns of 
lexicalization. Both languages possess expressions 
with the ECI constraint conventionalized. It is 
conventionalized or lexicalized into ISPs in 
Japanese, whereas Thai ISPs take a grammatical 
marking caŋ to have the similar effects. It is hoped 
that future studies will further reveal cross-
linguistic patterns of variation in this aspect of 
language for a more holistic typology. 
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